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We propose that late modern policing practices, that rely on neighbourhood intelligence, the 
monitoring of tensions, surveillance and policing by accommo-dation, need to be augmented 
in light of emerging ‘cyber-neighbourhoods’, namely social media networks. The 2011 riots in 
England were the first to evidence the widespread use of social media platforms to organise 
and respond to disorder. The police were ill-equipped to make use of the intelligence 
emerging from these non-terrestrial networks and were found to be at a disadvantage to the 
more tech-savvy rioters and the general public. In this paper, we outline the development of 
the ‘tension engine’ component of the Cardiff Online Social Media ObServatroy (COSMOS). 
This engine affords users with the ability to monitor social media data streams for signs of 
high tension which can be analysed in order to identify deviations from the ‘norm’ (levels of 
cohesion/low tension). This analysis can be overlaid onto a palimpsest of curated data, such 
as official statistics about neighbourhood crime, deprivation and demography, to provide a 
multidimensional picture of the ‘terrestrial’ and ‘cyber’ streets. As a consequence, this 
‘neighbourhood informatics’ enables a means of questioning official constructions of civil 
unrest through reference to the user-generated accounts of social media and their relationship 
to other, curated, social and economic data. 
 
Keywords: social media; tension monitoring; public order; riot; Cardiff Online Social 
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Introduction  
The rapid and widespread uptake of social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and 
YouTube has created new ways for people to interact and to share information. This brings both 
benefits and risks for civil society and new challenges for agencies responsible for safeguarding 
the public. The most senior prosecutor in England and Wales recently stated that ‘Social media is 
raising difficult issues of principle, which have to be confronted not only by prosecutors, but 
also by others including the police, the courts and service providers’ (BBC 2012). Certain 
behaviours that manifest on social media networks have become of concern for policing. In 
2011, several networks were implicated in playing a part in political demonstrations and riots 
(Morrell et al. 2011), and subsequent government reports have called for the expansion of the 
police diet to include the word on the ‘cyber 
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street’ in the anticipation of future public disorder (HMIC 2011a). Late modern policing 
practices, that rely on neighbourhood intelligence, surveillance, policing by accommodation 
and the monitoring of tensions are being augmented in light of these burgeoning ‘cyber-
neighbourhoods’. In the face of the techno-mediated 2011 riots in English cities, the police 
made use of the intelligence emerging from social media networks with limited success. If 
advantage is to be taken of this growing source of rumour and intelligence, bespoke 
computational tools are required that are designed for and tested against police personnel 
and other key informants. In this paper, we outline the development of the ‘social media 
tension-monitoring engine’ component of the Cardiff Online Social Media ObServatory 
(COSMOS).1 This engine affords users with the ability to monitor social media data streams 
for signs of high tension which can be analysed in order to identify deviations from the 
‘norm’ (levels of cohesion/low tension).  
Social and computational researchers have already begun to mine and ‘repurpose’ naturally 
occurring or ‘user-generated’ socially relevant data from social media networks in their efforts to 
anticipate offline social phenomena. For example, Tumasjan et al. (2010) were able to measure 
Twitter sentiment in relation to candidates in the German election concluding that this source of 
data was as accurate at predicting voting patterns as traditional polls. Again, in mining data from 
Twitter, Asur and Huberman (2010) correlated the sentiment expressed about movies with 
revenue, claiming that this method of prediction was more accurate than the gold standard 
Hollywood Stock Market. Beyond social networks, Ginsberg et al. (2009) successfully correlated 
flu-based search terms entered into the Google engine with visits to the local doctor in order to 
epidemiologically trace the spread of the disease across USA. More recently, the wealth of social 
media communications about major incidents of civil unrest, such as the riots in English cities 
during August 2011 (Procter and Voss 2013), have illustrated the potential significance of these 
technologies for spreading rumours and generating intelligence (HMIC 2011a). Social media 
streams can therefore be considered as new sources of information on the perceptions, opinions, 
actions, feelings and tensions expressed by individuals and their neighbourhoods.  
Not only might social media networks provide new opportunities to assess the mood of 
communities, they also offer the possibility to shift the influence from the few and the enfranchised to 
the many and the disenfranchised. Concepts of tension indication and community cohesion have been 
criticised as official constructions of civil unrest in Britain which obscure more profound political-
economic conflicts and misdiagnose them, most controversially in terms of ‘self-segregating’ 
residential populations leading ‘parallel lives’ (Home Office 2001, Kundnani 2001). Our concern here 
is not to provide some retrospective arbitration of these arguments but to use them to illustrate the 
importance of accessing alternative accounts of social problems in order to question official 
constructions. Existing intelligence on community tensions is derived from police observations and 
through engagement with neighbourhood forums that are often frequented by ‘upstanding 
neighbourhood citizens’ and various community ‘representatives’. How representative these accounts 
are of ‘hard-to-hear’ voices remains the subject of contention. Our principal concern is to question the 
contribution that analyses of social media communications can make to these more conventional 
forms of intelligence. Furthermore, if such data can be used to augment ‘terrestrial’ methods of 
tension monitoring, might they facilitate 
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a form of ‘synoptic’ power, in which the many can view the few and through which elite 
constructions of social problems can be challenged and revised (Mathieson 1997)? What, to 
continue the example, might the indication of social tensions ahead of the Burnley riot of 2001 
have looked like had the residential population, the police and agitators involved in this civil 
unrest all had access to new social media communications? Retrospective accounts of this riot 
argued that the police misinterpreted tension arising from the mobilisation of the far right-wing 
political organisations on the streets of Burnley and other Northern English cities in the summer 
of 2001. Instead, the police interpreted the escalation of violence in terms of a turf war over the 
street trade in illegal drugs (King and Waddington 2004). This can be taken as an exemplar of 
how social problems are framed by authorities in terms of their particular predilections and 
occupational cultures. Had the welter of alternative accounts that are facilitated by social media 
been available in 2001, it is at least plausible to argue that tension arising out of extreme right-
wing political agitation would have been reflected in social media communications thereby 
indicating other dynamics driving, indeed anticipating, the escalation of this civil unrest. 
Thinking forward to the present context, how might we analyse social media content to inform 
our understanding and anticipation of social conflicts? 
 
 
The rise of social media  
Boyd et al. (2007, p. 210) define social media networks as ‘web-based services that allow 
individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) 
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection and (3) view and traverse 
their list of connections and those made by others within the system’. These sites allow 
users to interact with other known and unknown users and make visible users’ social 
networks. This openness (unlike with more traditional Internet communications media) 
allows users to make connections with others that might have not been made otherwise. 
Unlike the original online community (e.g. newsgroups) of the late twentieth century that 
were centred on interests (Rheingold 1993), social media networks shift the focus to the 
individual, creating egocentric networks.  
Technologies which facilitated open social networks first emerged in 1997 but they remained 
largely unpopular compared to current usage (Boyd et al. 2007). The first decade of the twenty-
first century saw the exponential rise of social media in social and business domains. MySpace 
was one of the first successful social networking sites that was not advertised as a dating 
resource. It made full use of Web2.0 by allowing users to personalise their pages. Facebook 
began in early 2004 as a niche social network for US elite college students. From 2005, the site 
began to expand its user base beyond the college network, eventually opening up membership to 
everyone. Twitter, a micro-blogging service, was launched in 2006 and quickly became a popular 
alternative or addition to the more established social media networks. The network facilitates 
non-reciprocal links between users, meaning that the followed are not required to follow their 
followers. A hashtag convention has emerged amongst Twitter users that allows tweets to be 
tagged with a topic which is searchable. The term ‘trending’ is used to describe hashtags that 
become popular within the tweet-stream, indicating a peak or pulse in discussion usually 
surrounding an event or person. Unofficial estimates put social media network membership at 
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approximately 2.5 billion non-unique users, with Facebook, Google" and Twitter 
accounting for over half of these (Smith 2012). However, recent analysis has revealed that 
the majority of users of these sites rarely contribute (post updates) instead using the services 
to keep up to date with social, professional and news-related developments.2 
 
 
Social media and policing  
Research into social media and policing, in terms of communication with the public and 
monitoring user posts, is beginning to emerge. In the USA, Brainard and McNutt (2010) 
explored how the police interacted with citizens, how these interactions are structured and the 
extent to which interactions are informational, transactional or collaborative. They concluded 
that the majority of activity was informational and transactional, with very little being classified 
as collaborative. A recent study by LexisNexis Risk Solutions (2012) of US law enforcement use 
of social media shows that four out of every five officers in their sample used social media in 
investigations, with nearly half of these using it weekly. The most popular uses of social media by 
officers were identifying people and locations, discovering criminal activity and gathering 
evidence. Just over 80% of respondents who used social media anticipated using it even more in 
future police work, while just over 70% of those not currently using it intend to do so. In the 
UK, police use of social media has only recently emerged. The National Policing Improvement 
Agency (NPIA 2010) report Engage: Digital and Social Media for the Police Service outlines the 
ACPO strategy on the use of social media to engage with the public to better inform and 
support neighbourhood policing. Crump’s (2011) evaluation of the Engage strategy identified 
that as of October 2010, 30 police forces had a corporate twitter account, as did 140 
neighbourhood and local policing teams. The main uses of accounts included patrol updates on 
ongoing or concluded cases, requests for information from the public and partnership 
management (with other emergency services, local authorities, educational establishments, etc.). 
Crump (2011, 23) concluded that since the first use of social media in 2008 by police in England 
and Wales, the primary practice has been to communicate and engage with the public; but two-
way communication has been ‘limited’ with police failing to successfully elicit informa-tion from 
the public on a systematic basis. This reflects the findings of Brianard and McNutt in the USA 
and provides evidence that upto 2010 police use of social media has been largely non-
transformational.  
Since the August 2011 riots in England, reports of the police using social media for the gathering 
of intelligence began to emerge. The HMIC (2011a) report Rules of Engagement provided evidence 
that some police services were utilising freeware and shareware Twitter analytics platforms to monitor 
tensions, rumours and incitement to disorder during the riots. The report depicts instances where 
some police services were able to triangulate information on Twitter with independent information 
from officers on the streets and public reports. In a minority of cases, this intelligence was used to 
disrupt disorder from erupting in city centre areas via the redirection of resources. Despite these 
limited successes the report clearly states that police services in England did not have the technical or 
operational capacity to make best use of social media data for the monitoring of tensions and 
developing disorder. 
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Terrestrial tension monitoring  
The ACPO Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace (2000) recommended the monitoring of 
signs of tension in anticipation of public disorder. This was a further development of reforms 
aimed at improving the capacity of the police to anticipate civil unrest, which research into the 
history of tension indication in British policing dates back to a series of Home Office circulars 
on the need for improved intelligence following Lord Scarman’s report into the riots in Brixton, 
London and other English cities in 1981 (King and Brearley 1996, pp. 87-92). Tension indicators 
could include social, economic, political and environmental signs, including rising crime rates. 
Two-way communication channels between the police and the media and local community 
groups were recommended in order to gather neighbourhood intelligence on these signs from 
the most alienated, vulnerable and disaffected (ACPO 2000). Once identified, the police could 
intervene to reduce the causes of tension before further escalation and potential public 
disturbance. However, the limitations of tension indication revealed by the misdiagnosis of the 
riots in Burnley and other Northern English cities in 2001 provoked a further round of reform 
and debate about the anticipation of civil unrest. Chainey (2008) notes how gathering intelligence 
on signs of tension proved difficult for local police services. Initially, signs of tension were 
assumed to be conspicuous and hence easily monitored. In practical terms, for the majority of 
neighbourhood officers, tension indicators did not readily ‘exist’ beyond that of the more native 
crime rates. Furthermore, police systems were not geared up to routinely collect and analyse 
indicators of tension outside of this ‘crime risk paradigm’. As noted above, this was borne out in 
King and Waddington’s (2004) analysis of the causes of the Burnley riot in 2001 in which they 
noted how the local police were ill-equipped to read ‘alternative’ signs of tension, specifically, 
‘the full extent of white racist sentiment and corresponding fears and anxieties among its Asian 
communities in the build-up to the Burnley riot’ (King and Waddington 2004, p. 134). They 
conclude that Burnley police were preoccupied with conventional criminal indices of impending 
disorder, in particular drug and acquisitive crime, resulting in ‘crucial limitations in police 
procedures for anticipating and offsetting the outbreak of disorder’ (2004, p. 134). It is now well 
understood the Burnley riots came about due to a multiplicity of contributory factors including 
socio-economic marginalisation, disenfranchisement of young people and the presence of far-
right groups fomenting inter-ethnic conflict between socially excluded communities resident in 
the same neighbourhoods and, specifically, cultivating antipathy towards South Asian residents 
whom they depicted as benefitting from public expenditure, social housing and urban 
regeneration grants at the expense of the equally deprived white residential population; a rumour 
that was subsequently disproved (Amin 2003, Bagguley and Hussain 2008). One response to the 
perceived weaknesses of tension indication revealed by these riots has been to use official 
statistics on neighbourhood crime (particularly household burglary and criminal damage), 
deprivation (house-hold income and employment) and demography (age and educational 
attainment) to constitute a ‘Vulnerable Localities Index’ (VLI). The presumption here is that, ‘an 
area that has low levels of educational attainment, a high relative concentration of young people, 
is deprived and experiences high levels of burglary and criminal damage to dwellings is likely to 
be a neighbourhood that requires some prioritised attention’ (Chainey, 2008, p. 202). Even here, 
however, such formulaic modelling of 
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vulnerability on a limited set of official constructs runs the risk of obscuring other context-
specific and emergent indices of tension, such as the inter-ethnic conflict and racist street 
politics that preceded the riots in Burnley, Bradford and Oldham in 2001.  
Since these riots, several central government reports have developed more nuanced guidance 
on how local authorities and police should monitor tensions in local neighbourhoods. A 
Department for Communities and Local Government (2008) report recommended local service 
providers set up multiagency tension-monitoring groups with members from the statutory and 
voluntary sectors. These are advised to consider an array of intelligence, including crime 
statistics, community reports from wardens, gang and turf conflicts, demands for housing, 
political extremism and the like. A report by the Institute of Community Cohesion (2010) 
recommended that these groups adopt the Experienced, Evidenced, Potential (EEP) system to 
record, collate and assess community tension, which has been adopted by the majority of police 
services in England and Wales. The system operates by ascertaining how communities feel 
(perceived risks to the community and indivi-duals, and the spread of rumour; the ‘word on the 
street’), gathering evidence on what is happening (via reports to the police or other local 
services) and anticipating what may happen based on planned future events and changes in 
police service activity. The first element of the EEP system is the most challenging. Sources of 
information on community experience are difficult to tap into. While formal groups such as 
tenant and resident associations and neighbourhood forums provide some information from 
citizens who are engaged with their local services, the views of those that are socially excluded 
and disenfranchised often go unheard. The inability to fully tap into these hard-to-hear voices 
has been implicated in the failure of the police service to pre-empt disorder including the more 
recent riots in English cities in the summer of 2011 (HMIC 2011a). In summary, the recent 
official guidance on monitoring social tension continues to advocate the use of an admixture of 
conventional qualitative and quantitative indices. Our proposition is that analysis of social media 
communications augments these indices and may reorient our understanding of tension and 
social cohesion through reference to the mass of user-generated accounts of social problems in 
particular contexts and in near, and possibly real, time. If social media can be adequately sampled 
and used to indicate ‘offline’ behaviour, the analysis of this kind of data could be a revelation in 
broadening public understanding of civil unrest and attenuating dependence on elite, 
retrospective, constructions of social problems. 
 
 
Tension monitoring and social media  
Over a decade on from the Burnley riots, public order policing in the UK has gradually shifted 
from a reactive incident-motivated paradigm to one that is intelligence-led (King 2006). This late 
modern form of policing consists of a series of processes, including the routine gathering of 
neighbourhood intelligence beyond that of simple levels of crime. The HMIC (2011b) report 
Policing Public Order highlighted how the disorders in 2011 had taken on a new dimension 
which involved the use of Internet communications on fixed and mobile platforms. In particular, 
social networking sites (such as Twitter and Facebook) were implicated in the UK Uncut and 
university tuition fees protests in London in late 2011. Greer and 
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McLaughlin (2010) quoting Peat (2010) provide a vivid description of this new tech-savvy public: 
‘Armed with cell phones, BlackBerries or iPhones, the average Joe is now a walking eye on the 
world, a citizen journalist, able to take a photo, add a caption or a short story and upload it to the 
Internet for all their friends, and usually everyone else, to see’. Criminals (both organised and 
opportunists) have also begun to make use of these technologies to command the crowd in 
processes known as ‘crime sourcing’3 and ‘flash mobbing/robbing’. Goodman (2011) describes 
‘groups of individual criminals, who may or may not even know each other, are organising 
themselves online and suddenly descending into unsuspecting stores to steal all that they can in a 
flash. The unsuspecting merchant has little he can do when 40 unruly strangers suddenly run into 
his shop and run off with all his merchandise’. At the extreme end of the spectrum, social media 
use was also associated with the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions (Lotan et al. 2011, 
Choudhary et al. 2012).  
With over 97% of the public owning mobile phones in 2009, and just under half of these 
using smartphone functions in 2011 (Dutton and Blank 2011), an opportunity has arisen for the 
many to view the few and so exercise ‘synoptic power’ to question and revise elite constructions 
of social problems, such as civil unrest (Mathieson 1997, Edwards et al. 2013). This power is not 
limited by a ‘digital divide’ and restricted to wealthy owners of communication technologies as 
the advent of smartphones on cheaper ‘pay-as-you-go’ contracts have increased the prevalence 
of social media communications. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner in 2011 stated that ‘the 
game had changed’ referring to the numbers involved, the spread of disorder, short-notice or no-
notice events and swift changes in protest tactics all facilitated by social media networking 
(HMIC 2011b, p. 3). As a consequence, policing agencies are becoming more interested in the 
use of social media to gather intelligence (such as signs of tension) to assist in maintaining the 
peace. Social media also provide the police and other authorities with the capacity to ‘reassure’ 
the public and otherwise attempt to engineer social order. It can be anticipated that this will, in 
turn, generate competition between ‘citizen journalists’ and various state and corporate powers 
to constitute as well as represent competing visions of social order.  
An analysis into the 2011 riots in England implicated several causes, including group 
processes and the rapid flow of information facilitated by social media networks such as 
Twitter (HMIC 2011a, Morrell et al. 2011). A close analysis of the news coverage at the time 
of the riots and shortly afterwards, revealed that social media networks were being used in 
various ways, and not simply to coordinate and incite riotous behaviour. On the contrary, 
the pioneering study Reading the Riots revealed that social media networks were primarily 
being used to coordinate the clean-up effort, as well as to start and dispel rumours 
(Guardian 2011). What coordination for rioting did occur via social media was most likely 
to have been done on closed networks, such as the Blackberry Messenger service, which is 
only accessible to those that have been authorised to view and contribute to conversations. 
Nonetheless, the HMIC (2011a, p. 6) report into the police service response to the riots 
remarked that: 
 
Social media channels enabled individuals intent on criminal disorder to form communities, share 
their plans and organise on the streets: but police systems for tapping into this information source 
are not well developed compared to those used by 
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parts of the commercial sector. In truth, police were at times overwhelmed with information. 
 
A key recommendation of the report was to establish a central information hub to assist in the 
anticipation of disorder drawing together data from the street and social media streams. This 
social media-monitoring system would harvest data to analyse trends in community tension. The 
report anticipates that while such a monitoring system could not substitute for ‘terrestrial’ 
community engagement and intelligence gathering (which the report claims failed at the time of 
the riots in Tottenham) it could assist the police in gaining ‘a better understanding of their 
operating environment’ (HMIC 2011a, p. 7). Such a system would have affordances beyond 
policing public order, assisting other emergency services in an array of situations (e.g. advance 
flood warnings). Based on this recommendation, a private sector system was procured and 
trialled for the Olympics by the Metropolitan Police Service. It is likely that this system will now 
be rolled out to the rest of England, Wales and Scotland (Adams 2012). The evidence of the 
effectiveness of such systems in predicting disorder is nascent, but initial reports are 
encouraging. During the August 2011 riots the Metropolitan Police Service made use of freely 
available Twitter analytics software to gather intelligence with some success: 
 
Across London from Sunday 07 August onwards (and thereafter in other forces) there was 
open source information available about the potential spread of disorder. Police began 
monitoring this material as best they could in an effort to identify organisers or potential targets 
for attack by looters. So, for example, the Metropolitan Police successfully deployed officers to 
Oxford Circus as a result of monitoring and actioning information from social media. These 
officers arrived in time to confront 50 to 60 youths gathering in response to a message stating 
‘Meet Oxford Circus shops going to get smashed up. Get free stuff. (HMIC 2011a, p. 31) 
 
However, such successes were balanced with the problems of making sense of ‘big social data’ 
occurring in real time: ‘one Metropolitan Police officer recalled that tweets were appearing so fast that 
they fell off the bottom of the screen before anyone had a chance to read them’; and sorting the wheat 
from the chaff in the search for valid intelligence: ‘from an intelligence perspective, the information 
that was coming from social media sources was conflicting and often contained wrong or misleading 
items’ (HMIC 2011a, p. 31). Despite these problems, which may in part be mitigated by the new 
advanced system put in place for the Olympics, the police service are committed to incorporating 
social media interactions into their daily policing routine: ‘this fast-paced open source information 
space should be part of the street which they [officers] patrol . . . . the ability it offers to monitor 
mood and emotion and predict possible public order problems should not be overlooked’ (HMIC 
2011a, p. 36). 
 
 
Statement of the Problem  
Those responsible for monitoring tension are likely to find information gleaned from social 
media sources as challenging to interpret. Firstly, this is due to the amount of data produced in 
very short periods of time. Depending on the scope of the harvesting (which can range from a 
single Twitter account to all accounts globally), the data produced will often need to be collected, 
stored and analysed by machine. 
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Secondly, the quality of the data is impoverished due to the lack of ‘meta-data’ on posters’ 
identities (age, gender, race, etc.) and locations (of their home and from where the person is 
uploading their post). Finally, what citizen’s post on social media sites is often 
uncorroborated, meaning the data gleaned rarely progress from basic rumour to the status 
of intelligence.  
In relation to the first problem, most social media sites offer Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs) that facilitate the harvesting of user posts for subsequent analysis. The amount 
that can be harvested varies by provider. Twitter for example, has several services including the 
Spritzer (a randomly sampled 1% of all tweets), the Gardenhose (a randomly sampled 10%) and 
the Firehose (all public tweets). However, the provision of streams above 1% is rare. Most free 
and commercial software programs available that facilitate API access are subject to ‘rate 
limitations’ making missing data a potential problem. Once the data have been harvested analysts 
need to make sense of it. Most of the computer programs on the market make sense of social 
media data by analysing sentiment (positive and negative) and the popularity of words and 
hangtags (known as trending). This mode of analysis is widely used in the commercial sector to 
track brand popularity. The major challenge for policing is its use to monitor community 
tensions is untested, and it is questionable whether ‘sentiment tracking’ will yield results that are 
commensurate with ‘tension monitoring’.  
The second challenge is a significant barrier to the policing of impending public 
disorder. Privacy restrictions put in place by most social media providers prohibit the 
collection or storage of location data. Demographic information is also limited, with most 
APIs providing only the account number of posters. If social media networks are to be 
utilised for the monitoring of tensions, rapid access to data on the locations and 
demographics of posters is key.  
The final challenge is often experienced by police on the terrestrial street. Even when the 
information is a rumour that has been proved false, it remains important in gauging tensions. 
Yet, in tension monitoring, for information to become intelligence it must be triangulated with 
independent sources (iCoCo 2010). While existing commercial social media analysis platforms do 
provide access to RSS media feeds which may provide a valuable source for triangulation, none 
facilitate access to curated data-sets such as ONS neighbourhood statistics, Police.co.uk crime 
maps, or the Vulnerable Localities Index, much less to archives of qualitative research into the 
social contexts of civil unrest, for example the UK Economic and Social Data Service’s 
qualitative data archive ‘Qualidata’.4 
 
Methods  
This paper considers the first of these challenges: Is it possible to identify and monitor tension in 
social media in relation to a trigger event? In the following sections, we present the methodology 
and test results of the social media tension-monitoring engine, a component of the Cardiff 
Online Social Media Observatory (COSMOS). Currently, no software exists to measure tension 
in social media streams. The basis of our tension analysis draws in part on Beckett’s (1992) riot-
curve (Normal policing 0 High tension stage 0 Pre-riot stage 0 Riot stage (as the apex) 0 Post-
riot stage 0 Return to normality).5 Adapting this terrestrial process to the realm of social media 
was achieved by examining posts on an ordinal scale 
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e.g. (irrelevant noise) no tension 0 some tension 0 high tension. This provided a more nuanced 
scale tailored to signs of tension, as compared to the simple positive/ negative binary distinction 
offered by sentiment analysis. A set of language-based rules were employed to identify words, 
phrases, actors and events. These language-based rules (described in the following section) can 
be adapted to alternative tension-monitoring domains, such as those identified in King and 
Brearley’s (1996, p. 36) fourfold public order policing typology: political, industrial, festival and 
urban. Of course there is no ‘fixture list’ for urban rioting and so, for the purposes of empirical 
investigation into the use of social media communications as indices of tension and cohesion, we 
have targeted a more predictable, scheduled event, in particular sporting fixtures and within these 
incidents surrounding professional football competitions in England and Wales. Given the 
cultural heterogeneity and plurality of pastimes and media to be found in ‘late modern’ societies 
such as the UK, professional sport provides one of the few remaining events involving mass 
participation and interest and, therefore, a litmus test of collective tension. On these grounds, we 
sampled social media communications around a renowned incident of racial abuse between 
Patrice Evra, a professional footballer playing for Manchester United, and Luis Suarez of 
Liverpool football club in the autumn of 2011. 
 
 
Membership categorisation approach: collaborative algorithm design  
To build the ‘tension engine’ we assembled a team of experts in the fields of criminology, the 
sociology of language and computer science. The task of this team was to design a social media 
tension-monitoring system that drew on sociological concepts that could be digitally codified to 
operate in an online environment. We term this process Collaborative Algorithm Design. As part 
of this collaborative process we drew upon the work of Harvey Sacks and principally his research 
on Conversation Analysis and Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA). ‘Sacks’ (1992) work 
concerned close empirical analysis of everyday language in order to explicate the local 
organisational features of talk-in-interaction and textual forma-tions. Thus, his concern was with 
the plethora of description that everyday language exhibits. Furthermore, descriptions occur 
within a wide range of discursive contexts. For example, newspapers, business meetings and 
school lessons all provide for the generation of descriptions albeit within different contextual 
arrangements. We argue that naturally occurring social media updates e.g. ‘tweet formulations’ 
are no different in this respect.  
For Sacks, one of the important features of conversation and description is the display of 
categories and the methodical process of categorisation. In Sacks’ famous example, ‘the baby cried the 
mommy picked it up’ these considerations are illuminated by an analytical consideration of how we 
make sense of the story – we understand the story in terms of the ‘mommy’ picking up her ‘baby’ in 
response to the baby crying. For Sacks, we understand the story in this way because we associate the 
categories of ‘baby’ and ‘mommy’ with the membership categorisation device ‘the family’. Of course, 
both ‘baby’ and ‘mommy’ may be categories of further collections such as the ‘stage of life device’ 
(Baker 1984). Furthermore, in order to understand the particular common-sense reading that one 
usually makes when considering this sentence, Sacks invokes two rules of application, namely the 
economy rule and the consistency rule. The economy rule, according to Sacks (1992) refers to the 
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conversational process by which if a member uses a single category from any device then he/she 
can be recognised to be doing adequate reference to a person. The following consistency rule 
states that if a member of a given population has been categorised within a particular device then 
other members of that population can be categorised in terms of the same collection. Sacks 
(1992, p. 221) derives a corollary known as the hearer’s maxim that states ‘if two or more 
categories are used to categorise two or more members of some population and those categories 
can be heard as categories from the same collection then: hear them that way’.  
Sacks used the story, along with the predescribed rules of application, to generate a further 
set of analytical concepts, namely membership categorisation devices, membership categories 
and category-bound activities. Personal categories such as ‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘son’ or ‘daughter’ 
are described by Sacks as membership categories (MCs). Furthermore, they are viewed as 
membership categories of the membership categorisation device (MCD) ‘family’. In addition to 
this framework, the category machinery was complemented by the notion of category-bound 
activities/attributions (CBAs). According to Sacks, they can be understood as an attempt to 
describe how certain activities are commonsensically tied to specific categories and devices (e.g. 
in the case of Sacks’ story the tying of the activity of crying to the category ‘baby’). Sacks’ initial 
ideas concerning categories or descriptions involved a conceptualisation of an array of 
‘collections’ or a shared ‘stock of common-sense knowledge’ that membership categorisation 
devices were seen to encapsulate. For Sacks (1992), such categorisations and their devices 
formed part of the commonsensical framework of members’ methods and recognisable 
capacities of practical sense-making. Careful empirical analysis of naturally occurring data 
demonstrates that specific culturally stable membership categorisa-tion devices (with associated 
membership categories and category bound activities and attributions) can be seen to be in 
operation within a variety of contexts and routine speech acts.  
Given the organisational characteristics of social media updates (e.g. the 140 character-
length tweet) membership categorisation analysis provides an empirically tested approach to 
the understanding of natural language practice which relies on social explication and inter-
subjective interaction as opposed to occluded internal processes. It is a model of human 
category and associated linguistic work based on the systematic observation of everyday 
human practice and empirical materials (Housley 2002, Housley and Fitzgerald 2002, 2009). 
As a consequence, it provides a means of developing some bespoke rules that can inform 
the analysis of large scale social media data (in this case Twitter data) that can identify 
relevant ‘topic events’ and provide a way of analysing content in terms of category 
configuration and different forms of attribution and activity (See Burnap et al. 2013 for a 
technical description).  
With the classification task in mind, experiments were conducted to determine whether the 
principals of MCA were applicable to classifying tension in tweets that were specifically related 
to an event. Figure 1 below outlines the computational tension engine rules and the 
corresponding tension ordinal scale provided to human police coders. We assumed the MCD to 
be the event itself (i.e. the Suarez-Evra Incident) and that for a tweet to be relevant to the event 
it should contain at least one reference to a MC within that MCD (i.e. ‘Suarez’, ‘Evra’). All tweets 
contain ‘Suarez’ as that was one of the keywords used to select the data from the COSMOS 
Twitter 
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 Police Coder Ordinal Scale  MCA Tension Engine Rules 
 
 Irrelevant 0. Not relevant/Noise 
 
 
Some Tension 
1. MC + Predicate 
 
 2. MCD + MC 
 
  3. MCD + Predicate 
 
  4. MCD + MC + Predicate 
 
 
Tension 
5. MCD + MC + Predicate (Inc. Extreme 
 
 Case Formulations) 
 
 High Tension 6. MCD + MC + Predicate (Inc. Extreme 
 
  Case Formulations and Degradation Terms) 
 
Figure 1. Tension scale.   
 
 
archive, but the presence of ‘Evra’ confirms the MCD presence through the notion of 
standardised relational pairs – the presence of this pair indicates an association of the tweet to an 
event, in the same way ‘mommy’ and ‘baby’ are associated in the MCD ‘the family’. Where only 
one MC was mentioned, we applied the MCA concept of Category Bound Attribution or 
Activity (CBA) to further examine the tweet. CBAs include predicates that are used in relation to 
a membership category. Based on the observations from the 10% sample of our coded data-set, 
it was evident that CBAs relate very well to the accusation terms used in tweets (e.g. ‘Suarez 
abused him’, ‘Suarez called Evra’, ‘Suarez discriminated against him’) or attributing claims that 
one of the MCs (Suarez) conducted such actions and therefore ‘Suarez is a racist’. CBAs within 
tweets were used to classify tension by weighting different predicates used in association with a 
MC, with different types of CBA being given a different weighting. For example, mentions of a 
MC and an activity or attribution predicate, such as ‘racism’, ‘racist’, ‘called’ (for full list of terms 
see Burnap et al. 2013) were weighted as being relevant to the event (i.e. not in the ‘irrelevant’ 
class). Tweets without these features as a minimum were classified as ‘irrelevant’. Tweets 
featuring a MC, a CBA and a mild expletive were classified as ‘High Tension’. A small number of 
‘extreme’ expletives were also defined, the presence of which automatically led to the 
classification of a tweet as ‘High Tension’. Expletives used with a CBA and ‘extreme’ expletives 
were therefore weighted towards higher levels of tension. 
 
An algorithm was defined for the codification of the MCA principles and assumptions 
based on observations from the test set (see Burnap et al. 2013). This algorithm effectively 
represents the method used to classify tension with a tension analysis engine. This 
implementation is specific to racism but the advantage of using the conceptual framework 
of MCA is that it allows for future developments to the tension analysis engine to include 
other types of tension (e.g. homophobic, economic, political) by changing the MC and CBA 
lists to include different actors and activities. 
 
 
Data collection and analysis  
Data were extracted from the Twitter streaming API one month before and after the event 
selected to test the social media tension-monitoring engine. The streaming API 
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delivers all matching tweets upto a 1% limit.6 Search terms relevant to the event (Suarez, Evra and 
FA) were used to derive the sample of tweets. The data corpus consisted of 1022 tweets each with the 
standard maximum of 140 characters. The study corpus was manually coded four times by four police 
constables (equal representation by gender and job type: response and neighbourhood) using an 
ordinal scale from 0 to 3 where: 0 meant the tweet was irrelevant (i.e. was not related to the event); 1 
meant the tweet contained ‘some tension’ related to the event; 2 meant the tweet contained ‘tension’ 
related to the event; and 3 meant the tweet contained ‘high tension’ related to the event (see Figure 1). 
The police coders were provided with the scale and a short description of the ordinal points. No 
details of how the researchers were using language analysis tools (i.e. MCA) were provided. The 
application of degrees of tension to individual tweets was then entirely subjective and relied upon 
‘tacit’ policing knowledge and discretion. Following the police coding exercise, we measured the 
degree to which the individual coders agreed, that is, how often they all coded a single tweet with the 
same level of tension. To calculate the level of inter-coder agreement we used Krippendorf ’s Alpha 
coefficient – a well-known statistical measure of agreement between independent coders where a 
measure of 0 indicates no agreement and a measure of 1 indicates perfect agreement. Despite the 
flexibility of having three levels of tension to choose from, the inter-rater agreement calculated was 
0.67, which is deemed an acceptable level of agreement for tentative conclusions (Krippendorff 
2004).7 The majority of tweets were identified by the police coders as not related to the event, with 
536 (52%) of the 1022 coded tweets being coded as irrelevant by our coders. A further 306 (30%) 
were coded as having ‘some tension’, 132 (13%) as ‘tension’ and 48 (5%) as ‘high tension’. We 
therefore had a significant number of tweets in the ‘tension’ and ‘high tension’ classes that had the 
potential to be distinguished from lower levels, indicating clear spikes in tension. 
 
 
 
Findings  
In order to assess the efficacy of the computationally automated social media tension-monitoring 
engine we compared its results against the police-coded results (taken as the ‘gold standard’ in 
this experiment). This is the most commonly used design in the field of automated text 
classification (van Rijsbergen 1979). The results are provided using standard text classification 
measures of: precision (the fraction of retrieved tweets that are relevant to the search – i.e. for 
each class how many of the retrieved tweets were of that class); recall (fraction of tweets that are 
relevant to the search that are successfully retrieved –  i.e. for each class how many tweets coded 
as that class were retrieved); F-Measure, a harmonised mean of precision and recall; and 
Accuracy, the total correctly classified tweets normalised by the total number of tweets. The 
results for each measure range between 0 (worst) and 1 (optimum). Due to the operational need 
in policing to detect spikes in tension there was a particular interest in the accurate identification 
of ‘tension’ and ‘high tension’ tweets (the two highest levels). Thus, macro-averaged results for 
each class and micro-averaged results for performance across all classes are presented in Figures 
2 and 3, respectively. The formulae for calculating these results are as follows (where TP #true 
positives, FP #false positives, TN #true negative, FN #false negative, P #precision and R 
#Recall): Precision #TP/TP"FP; Recall #TP/TP"FN; F-Measure #2 $((P $R)/(P"R)); Accuracy 
#(TP"TN)/(TP"FP"FN"TN). 
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   ‘Irrelevant’      ‘Some Tension’   
 
  
M
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 Human coders   
M
ac
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n
e 
 Human coders  
 
   Yes  No    Yes  No  
 
  Yes 501  129   Yes 163  68  
 
  No 35  357   No 143  648            
 
   Precision = 0.80    Precision = 0.71   
 
   Recall = 0.93    Recall = 0.53   
 
   F-measure = 0.86    F-measure = 0.61   
 
   Accuracy = 0.84    Accuracy = 0.79   
 
             
 
               
 
   ‘Tension’      ‘High Tension’   
 
  
M
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hi
n
e 
 Human coders   
M
ac
hi
n
e 
 Human coders  
 
   Yes  No    Yes  No  
 
  Yes 65  58   Yes 26  12  
 
  No 67  830   No 22  962            
 
   Precision = 0.53    Precision = 0.68   
 
   Recall = 0.49    Recall = 0.54   
 
   F-measure = 0.51    F-measure = 0.60   
 
   Accuracy = 0.88    Accuracy = 0.97   
 
               
 
 
Figure 2. Macro-averaged precision and recall results for the automated social media tension 
monitoring engine (individual tension levels). 
 
At a macro-averaged level, the performance of the tension engine is outstanding, achieving a 
precision and recall of 0.74 (van Rijsbergen 1979). However, an examination of performance at 
macro-averaged level for each class is necessary to evaluate the ability of the tension-monitoring 
engine to detect spikes in tension – a key requirement for policing. The engine’s precision 
performance is very good for ‘Some Tension’ and ‘High Tension’, with scores of 0.71 and 0.68, 
respectively. The ‘High Tension’ result is particularly encouraging as it is this result that indicates 
the ability to accurately identify spikes in tension. The accuracy score of 0.97 shows that ‘High 
Tension’ tweets are classified accordingly and other classes are correctly excluded from this 
category, evidencing reliability in producing accurate spikes. ‘Tension’ per precision performance 
is not as accurate at 0.53. However, this result compares favourably with other automated 
methods of tension detection online (see Burnap et al. 2013). 
 
‘All Codes’  
M
ac
hi
n
e 
 Human coders 
 
 Yes No 
 
Yes 755 267 
 
No 267 2797   
  
Precision = 0.74  
Recall = 0.74  
F-measure = 0.75  
Accuracy = 0.87 
 
Figure 3. Macro-averaged precision and recall results for the automated social media tension 
monitoring engine (all levels combined). 
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Figure 4. Daily police assigned tension levels.
Figure 5. Daily tension engine assigned tension levels.
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Next, we turned to examining the temporal dimension and visualised spikes and troughs in 
tension. Figure 4 represents the number of police coded tweets by level of tension over the 
duration of the event in question. Key moments during the unfolding of the event are indicated 
which correspond to increases in Twitter traffic and tension levels. This correlation resonates 
with other research on Twitter and event reaction (see Sakaki et al. 2010). Figure 5 illustrates the 
tension over time as classified by the tension engine. A rough mirroring between the two figures 
demonstrates the tension engine matched the police coded tension levels at key moments during 
the event. Most notably, spikes in tension in the police-coded tweets match the spikes produced 
by the tension engine (20 November, 20 and 21 December, 27 January). These temporal results, 
combined with the positive text classification findings indicate that the social media tension-
monitoring engine and the MCA methodology function as a sound alternative to human police 
coders. 
 
 
Discussion  
Over a decade ago the ACPO Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace (2000) stressed 
the utility of tension monitoring in anticipating public disorder. At this time tension 
indicators were envisaged to include crime rates, social and political instability, economic 
deprivation and environmental degradation. Sources of intelligence on tension could include 
‘sentinels’ offering direct police observations of local neighbourhoods and crime patterns, 
plus informants, resident and tenant associations and neighbourhood forums to get at ‘the 
word on the street’. The former relies on the tacit knowledge of policing most likely 
informed by the ‘crime risk paradigm’ – a preoccupation identified as a key factor in the 
failure to predict the escalation of public disorder in the Burnley riots (King and 
Waddington 2004). The latter source being more difficult to cultivate is a less common, but 
an infinitely richer and arguably more accurate barometer of tensions in local communities. 
However, even this source of intelligence is not without its flaws, including the promotion 
of partisan views at the exclusion of those from ‘hard-to-hear’ and excluded populations – 
‘the boys in the hood’.  
The now near ubiquitous access to cheap smartphone technology has seen the socio-
economic digital divide close rapidly, being filled by excluded and disenfran-chised youth who 
revel in updating all who care to listen about their daily activities, happenings, opinions and 
gripes. Communicating in this fashion is now an extension of everyday life for many and can 
operate as a primary source of expression about feelings. Furthermore, social media 
communication is augmenting, and to some extent provides a surrogacy to, traditional terrestrial 
forms of communal commu-nication about issues in local neighbourhoods which can include a 
wider representa-tion of the population (Edwards et al. 2013). A simple count of local 
community forums on Twitter in the cities of Cardiff and Manchester show over 100 groups 
discussing topics that range from parking to burglary. A ‘social-listening’ of these and individual 
channels of communication can provide a rich source of data on rising and lowering community 
tensions adding an additional digital layer onto more conventional terrestrial intelligence creating 
a form of ‘neighbourhood informatics’.  
The results reported above provide evidence that the automated collection and analysis of 
social media channels (in this case Twitter) for the identification and monitoring of tensions is 
possible. Adapting Sack’s Membership Categorisation 
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Analysis to a computational algorithm via a process we term ‘Collaborative Algorithm Design’ 
(the digital codifying of sociological concepts via the close working partnership of social and 
computer scientists) yielded results that compared favourably with the human police coded data. 
The prototype social media tension-monitoring engine, a part of COSMOS, then ameliorates the 
first problem outlined earlier in the paper – that social media data presents a significant challenge 
to the police analyst in terms of the volume of data produced in short periods of time, and the 
difficultly of making sense of the content in a way that relates to police priorities.  
On the question of whether sentiment analysis tools yields results that are commensurate 
with our tension-monitoring engine we have published a paper which demonstrates the superior 
efficacy of the latter (Burnap et al. 2013). The paper shows that while the harmonised mean of 
precision and recall – the F-measure – is similar for both tools for the ‘Some Tension’ class, the 
tension engine performs better at the higher end of the tension scale, which makes it more useful 
for detecting raised spikes in tension that are so important in predicting the likelihood of public 
disorder. We conclude in this paper that extremes in positive and negative sentiment are not 
directly related to tension and that tension detection requires more than sentiment analysis alone. 
Both sets of results provide evidence to suggest our social media tension-monitoring engine both 
outperforms human police coders (in terms of volume and speed of classification) and other 
machine supported classification engines (in terms of superior classification accuracy and 
precession compared to sentiment analysis).  
While we have been able to empirically test which automatic tools best agree with human 
police coders on the topic of tension in tweets, there remain many questions yet to be answered. 
As we delineated earlier in the paper, questions over the lack of demographic metadata (gender, 
location, race, etc.) and the fidelity of information in social media networks seem to still elude us 
(however, see Morgan et al. 2013 for advances in these areas). For example, can rumour on 
social media networks be promoted to intelligence via triangulation with other data sources to 
create a form of ‘neighbourhood informatics’? Furthermore, the extent to which social media 
content represents the voices of the ‘hard-to-hear’ and how these channels may afford a 
‘synoptic’ reordering of relations and offer alternatives to official constructions of crime and 
disorder problems in local communities remains largely unexplored. But perhaps the most 
challenging is establishing the reciprocal relationship between online expression and offline 
action, which remains largely untested. Only extended use of social media automated tension 
monitoring with a retrospective analysis post public disorder will reveal what levels of online 
expression are associated with a migration of tension from online to offline contexts. And this 
would only be possible if online tensions were being expressed via open platforms, and not 
closed networks such as Blackberry Messenger (Procter and Voss 2013). However, to rule out 
social media monitoring on this basis would be improvident. We still do not understand well 
enough how tensions expressed offline relate to the break-out of public disorder. Pinpointing the 
tipping point of high-tension to riot and extrapolating from that a predictive mechanism may 
well be a fool’s errand. But what is clear is that including social media in the policing diet 
enriches and enlarges the monitoring pool providing more data-points with which to triangulate 
and trace the ebb and the flow of tensions. 
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Conclusion  
The HMIC (2011a) report The Rules of Engagement highlighted the need for a social media 
monitoring system that could augment ‘terrestrial’ community engagement and intelligence 
gathering on neighbourhood tension. Such a system would assist the police to better understand 
their ‘multi-site’ online-offline operating environment. However, as noted in this paper those 
responsible for monitoring tension are likely to find information gleaned from social media 
sources as challenging to handle due to the rate and amount of data produced and the difficulty 
in interpreting and making sense of content. Existing commercially available social media 
monitoring systems make sense of content by analysing sentiment. Adopting such technology to 
monitor tensions in anticipation of public disorder without scientific investigation into its 
adaptability is short-sighted. The results from this paper represent the first step in this scientific 
process. Adapting language based tools advocated by Sacks (1992) and Housley and Fitzgerald 
(2002) via the process of Collaborative Algorithm Design, social scientists in collaboration with 
computer scientists have developed an automated social media tension-monitoring system that 
demonstrates a high level of agreement with human police coders (especially in the case of high 
tension). When compared to sentiment analysis tools the tension engine produced more 
efficacious results (see Burnap et al. 2013), particularly in relation to identifying spikes in tension. 
While this paper reports the first scientific evidence on identifying tensions in social media 
networks, there are however several shortcomings that need highlighting. We took police human 
coders as the ‘gold standard’ against which to evaluate our tension engine, aiming to draw on 
their ‘tacit’ policing knowledge in identifying tension. Clearly a question remains over the 
applicability of this ‘tacit’ knowledge to the online environment when it has been inculcated 
mostly in offline contexts. Further refinement of this research method will need to involve a 
broader sampling of social groups with other tacit knowledge of civil unrest, including those 
directly involved in particular incidents. Further, our data corpus related to only one type of 
event – a sporting event with associated racial tension. It still remains to be seen if the tension 
engine will produce as positive results in relation to other types of events (political protests, 
industrial action, etc.). Finally, and perhaps fundamentally, the reciprocity between online 
expression and offline action is still largely not understood and further investigation is necessary 
before full advantage can be taken of the new digital tools of ‘neighbourhood informatics’ to 
compare and contrast alternative concepts of civil unrest. 
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Notes  
1.  http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/socsi/research/researchgroups/comsc-socsi/projects.html.  
2.  http://blog.Twitter.com/2011/09/one-hundred-million-voices.html.  
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3. Derived from crowd-sourcing: the act of outsourcing a task to a large, undefined group of people 
through an open call.   
4. The Cardiff Online Social Media ObServatory (COSMOS) will be the first platform to integrate social 
media analytics with secondary data from all these sources. COSMOS is currently a case study for the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) Application Program-ming Interface (API) project, which aims to 
provide access to all ONS datasets.  
5. Beckett’s model was adapted by ACPO in 1992: Sporadic disorder 0 Riot 0 Serious rioting 0 Lethal 
rioting (as the apex) 0 Immediate post-riot 0 Community unrest (ACPO 1992) and altered in 2000 
to the ‘disorder model’ to reflect a more holistic approach to public order policing: Unrest 0 
Serious disorder/Riot 0 Disorder 0 Tension. See King and Waddington (2004) for a discussion of 
the ‘riot curve’ and its development.   
6.  https://dev.twitter.com/docs/faq#6861.  
7. ‘Where tentative conclusions are deemed acceptable, may an a]0.667 suffice’ (Krippendorff 2004, 
p. 241).  
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